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ABSTRACT 
In 2003, Hwang et al. proposed a new blind signature based on the RSA cryptosystem. The Extended Euclidean 
algorithm is employed in their proposed scheme. They claimed that the proposed scheme was untraceable and it could 
meet all requirements of a blind signature. However, we find that the signer can still trace the blind signature applicant 
in some cases. Thus, we present the security flaw of Hwang et al.’s scheme in this paper. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1982, Chaum proposed the concept of blind signature 
[1]. In blind signature schemes, an applicant can obtain 
a signature of a message from the signer without 
revealing the content of the signed message to the signer. 
Blind signature can be used in many cryptographic 
applications, such as electronic voting systems and 
electronic cash payment systems. Thus, how to make 
the resulting message-signature pair not be able to be 
linked is an important issue. On the other hand, the 
personal information should be protected while the 
resulting message-signature pair is used in any 
application. As a result, Chaum proposed the first blind 
signature ensuring the user’s private information. With 
the progressive improvement of the blind signature [2], 
[4]-[6], the requirements of the blind signature, (1) 
correctness, (2) blindness, (3) unforgeability, and (4) 
untraceability, are listed and described as follows: 
(1) Correctness: Anyone can check the blind 
signature of the signed message by using the server’s 
public key. 
(2) Blindness: The signer has no idea of the 
content of the signed message. 
(3) Unforgeability: Only the signer can generate 
the signature. That is, no one can forge a valid signature 
and can have the forged signature verified successfully. 
(4) Untraceability: The signer of the blind 
signature cannot link the message-signature pair even if 
the signature has been revealed to be public. 
 
Recently, Hwang et al. [7] proposed a blind signature 
based on the RSA cryptosystem [9]. It also employs the 
Extended Euclidean algorithm [8]. They claimed that 
the proposed scheme is untraceable and meets all 
requirements of a blind signature mentioned above. And 
the security of the proposed scheme is based on the 
difficulties of solving the factoring problem. However, 
in some cases, the signer can still trace the blind 
signature applicant. As a result, we present its security 
flaw in this paper. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, we 
review Hwang et al.’s untraceable blind signature in 
Section 2. Then the drawback of Hwang et al.’s scheme 
is shown in Section 3. Finally, the conclusions are given 
in Section 4. 
 
2. A REVIEW OF HWANG ET AL.’S 
UNTRACEABLE BLIND SIGNATURE 
 
In this section, we review Hwang et al.’s proposed 
untraceable blind signature, which consists of five 
phases: (1) the initialization phase, (2) the blinding 
phase, (3) the signing phase, (4) the unblinding phase, 
and (5) the verification phase. The five phases are 
presented in Subsections 2.1 to 2.5, respectively.  
 
2.1 The Initialization Phase 
 
In this phase, the signer S makes the essential 
information public as follows: 
Step 1. S randomly selects two large prime numbers p 
and q and computes n = p⋅ q and φ(n) = (p-1)(q-1).  
Step 2. S chooses two large random numbers e and d, 
where gcd(e, φ(n)) = 1, e⋅ d mod φ(n) = 1. 
Step3. S keeps p, q, and d secret and makes e, n, and H 
public, where H is a one-way hash function—MD5 and 
SHA-1 [3] for example. 
 
2.2 The Blinding Phase 
 
Suppose the requester R has a message m and wants m 
signed without being known by S. R performs the 
following steps to make m concealed. 
Setp 1. R randomly selects two distinct numbers t1 and 
t2. 
Step 2. R chooses two random primes a1 and a2, where 
gcd(a1, a2) = 1. 
Step 3. R computes nmod)m(Hts 1ae11 ⋅= and s2 
= .nmod)m(Ht 2ae2 ⋅  
Step 4. R sends s1 and s2 to S. 
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2.3 The Signing Phase 
 
After getting s1 and s2 from R, S generates the 
corresponding blind signature of m as follows: 
Step 1. S randomly chooses two primes b1 and b2, where 
gcd(b1, b2) = 1. 
Step 2. S computes nmodsr d1b11 =  and r2 = d2b2s  
mod n. 
Step 3. S sends (r1, r2, b1, b2) to R. 
 
2.4 The Unblinding Phase 
 
Upon receiving (r1, r2, b1, b2), R performs as follows to 
derive the blind signature s of m. 
Step 1. R computes nmodtrg 1b111
−⋅= and g2 = r2⋅ 
.nmodt 2b2
−  
Step 2. R finds w and t according to Extended Euclidean 
Algorithm [3], where (a1b1)w + (a2b2)t = 1, and keeps b1, 
b2, w, and t secret. 
Step 3. R computes s = g1w⋅ g2t mod n and then 
publishes (m, s). 
 
2.5 The Verification Phase 
 
In order to verify the signature s of m, the verifier V 
computes H(m) and se mod n. Then V checks whether 
H(m) = se mod n holds or not. If it holds, it denotes that 
s is indeed the signature of m. 
 
3. THE SECURITY FLAW OF HWANG ET AL.’S 
UNTRACEABLE BLIND SIGNATURE 
 
In this section, we are going to show how the signer 
traces the blind signature in Hwang et al.’s proposed 
scheme. To make tracing the blind signature easier, S 
chooses two primes p and q, where 4|p+1 and 4|q+1, 
and computes n = p⋅ q and φ(n) = (p-1)*(q-1). Then S 
randomly chooses two large numbers e and d, where 
gcd(e, φ(n)) = 1, e⋅ d mod φ(n) = 1.  
 
First, as shown in the blinding phase, R has a message 
m and wants m signed without being known by S. Then, 
R performs as follows: 
Setp 1. R randomly selects two distinct numbers t1 and 
t2. 
Step 2. R chooses two random primes a1 and a2, where 
gcd(a1, a2) = 1. 
Step 3. R computes nmod)m(Hts 1ae11 ⋅= and s2 = t2e 
⋅ .nmod)m(H 2a  
Step 4. R sends s1 and s2 to S. 
 
Second, as shown in the signing phase, S generates the 
corresponding blind signature of m as follows: 
Step 1. S chooses two random primes b1 and b2, where 
gcd(b1, b2) = 1. 
Step 2. S computes nmodsr d1b11 =  and r2 = d2b2s  
mod n. 
Step 3. S sends (r1, r2, b1, b2) to R. 
 
Third, as shown in the unblinding phase, R gets (m, s), 
where s = H(m)d mod n. After performing the above 
procedures several times, S can get (s1, s2)’s and (s1d 
mod n, s2d mod n)’s. Because 1ae11 )m(Hts ⋅= mod n 
and ,nmod)m(Hts 2ae22 ⋅=  we can have s1d = 
t1* nmod))m(H( 1ad  and s2d = t2* .nmod))m(H( 2ad  
That is, S can collect all the (t1* ,nmod))m(H( 1ad  
t2* nmod))m(H( 2ad )’s. 
 
Now, suppose that S knows (m′, δ), where δ = H(m′)d 
mod n. If t1, t2, and (H(m)d mod n) are co-prime and a1 < 
a2 possibly, S can find the relation between (s1d mod n, 
s2d mod n) and δ as follows: 
Step 1. S computes gcd(t1* ,nmod))m(H( 1ad  t2* 
nmod))m(H( 2ad )= .nmod)m(H 1a*d  
Step 2. S computes η = ( nmod)m(H 1a*d ) * δ mod n.  
Step 3. S computes 
c1 = η (p+1)/4 mod p, 
c2 = (p - η (p+1)/4) mod p, 
c3 = η (q+1)/4 mod q, 
c4 = (q- η (q+1)/4) mod q, 
x = q(q-1 mod p),   y = p(p-1 mod q), 
β1 = (xc1+yc3) mod n, 
β2 = (xc1+yc4) mod n, 
β3 = (xc2+yc3) mod n, and 
β4 = (xc2+yc4) mod n   [8]. 
Step 4. If there exists a βj such that βi* δ(φ(n)/2) = βj mod 
n, where i ≠ j and 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 4, this denotes that δ is 
related to (t1* ,nmod))m(H( 1ad t2* 
nmod))m(H( 2ad ). 
If m=m′, we have  
η= nmod))m(H( 1ad 1+ . (1) 
Because a1 is odd, a1+1 is an even number. As a result, 
η= nmod)))m(H(( 22/)1a(d 1+ .   (2) 
Equation (2) can be rewritten as the follow equation.  
η= )nmod)))m(H((( 22/)11a(d + * )nmod)m(H( )n(φ mod 
n. (3) 
Since m = m′, we have  
η= )nmod)))m(H((( 22/)1a(d 1+ * (H(m′)φ(n) mod n) 
mod n                    (4) 
= ( )nmod))m(H(( 2/)1a(d 1+ * (H(m′)φ(n)/2 mod n))2 mod 
n.                   (5)   
According to the above equation, we can get 
η1/2 = )nmod))m(H(( 2/)1a(d 1+ * (H(m′)φ(n)/2 mod n) 
mod n.                   (6) 
From Equation (1), we have  
η1/2 = )nmod))m(H(( 2/)1a(d 1+ .  (7) 
 
According to the properties of Rabin’s [8], we know 
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there exist at most four distinct solutions for η1/2 mod n. 
That is, at least one βi will equal to 
)nmod))m(H(( 2/)11a(d +  for 1 ≤ i ≤ 4. Therefore, if m 
= m′, we have 
βj =βi * (H(m′)φ(n)/2 mod n) mod n  (8) 
= βi *δφ(n)/2 mod n.       (9) 
 
As a result, S checks whether any βi* δ(φ(n)/2) = βj mod n 
for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 4 and i ≠ j, in Step 4. 
 
According to the above procedures, it is obvious that S 
can trace the blind signature in Hwang et al.’s proposed 
blind signature scheme.  
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Hwang et al. proposed a new blind signature based on 
the RSA cryptosystem by employing the Extended 
Euclidean algorithm. Though they claimed that the 
proposed scheme was untraceable and it could meet all 
requirements of a blind signature, however, we find that 
the signer can still trace the blind signature applicant in 
some cases. On the other hand, the computation load of 
Hwang et al’s scheme is too heavy. There still exists 
space for improving the proposed blind signature 
scheme. 
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